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‘LIKE A BIRD WITH THE GIFT OF REASON’: MAXIMUS OF TYRE ON 
THE FREEDOM OF DIOGENES THE CYNIC 
J More (Stellenbosch University) 
In his thirty-sixth oration, Maximus of Tyre draws on Greek 
philosophical and literary traditions, including the myth of the 
Golden Age, to encourage his audience to emulate Diogenes the 
Cynic. While some consider Maximus a philosophical dilettante, I 
argue here that this oration serves, rather, as an example of a popular 
philosophy. 




Some time during the reign of Commodus (180-192 CE), Maximus of Tyre 
produced a dialexis — a popular discourse or philosophical sermon — in which he 
holds up the life of the Cynic Diogenes as an ideal after which his hearers should 
strive. In Oration 36, Maximus presents Diogenes as someone who, by enacting 
radical forms of freedom, escaped the ‘hostile circumstances’ (περιστάσεις) that 
plague all human beings. Maximus draws on various philosophical and literary 
traditions and topoi in his attempt to encourage his audience to follow Diogenes’s 
example. Against those who have tended to see Maximus as a second-rate 
philosopher, I will show that Maximus occupies a specific position among the 
intellectuals of the Second Sophistic. His writing about Diogenes provides us with 
an example of popular philosophical teaching from the second century. 
Our sources say very little about Maximus. They place him in the second 
half of the second century CE, link him to Tyre, and identify him as having spoken 
in Rome on at least one occasion.1 Apart from this, all we see of this figure is  
the shadow cast by his extant forty-one speeches. The majority of these relatively 
short sermons2 focus on ethical matters. A handful touch on theology, physics, 
                                                   
1   For a discussion of these sources and their claims, see Trapp 1997a:xi-xii; Lauwers 
2015:1-3. 
2  While Maximus identifies his works simply as ‘discourses’ (λόγοι) or ‘reflections’ 
(σκέμματα), the texts are called ‘investigations’ (ζητήματα) in the Suda and 
‘discussions’ (διαλέξεις) in the manuscript titles (Trapp 1997a:xl-xli); see also Lauwers 
2015:125-132.  In order to signal what I take to be the more popular style employed by 
Maximus, I will follow Michael Trapp’s language in his ANRW essay in which he 
identifies these texts as ‘philosophical sermons’ delivered by a ‘preacher’ (1997b:1950, 
1975). 
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psychology, and epistemology; not one of them addresses logic. Throughout his 
sermons, Maximus avoids technical philosophical jargon in order to offer his 
hearers ‘a relatively simple and undemanding form of philosophy’ (Trapp 
1997b:1949). 
Some modern scholars identify Maximus as a sophist, while others have 
labelled him a Halbphilosoph.3 These terms are used to highlight the lack of 
philosophical depth and sophistication in Maximus’s sermons. In contrast to this 
negative assessment, Jeroen Lauwers (2015) has recently argued that if attention is 
given to Maximus’s self-presentation and to the nature of his texts in the context of 
other Imperial intellectuals, the Tyrian should be recognised as a philosopher, 
albeit one engaging in a particular mode of philosophy. Maximus presents his 
hearers with accessible instruction in Greek culture and philosophy, not purely for 
the sake of knowledge, but that they might live well. 
In his first sermon,4 Maximus expresses scepticism about the pursuit of a 
certain type of activity  identified as ‘philosophy’ by some: 
If you think that philosophy is simply a matter of nouns and verbs, or skill 
with mere words, or refutation and argument and sophistry, and of time 
spent on accomplishments like that, then there is no problem in finding a 
teacher. The world is full of that kind of sophist, and their brand of 
philosophy is easy to acquire; the quest is soon over (Or. 1.8.1-5).5 
Here, Maximus denigrates sophistry and a type of philosophy that is overly 
concerned with definitions. Similarly, in Oration 21, Maximus cites a Platonic 
precedent (Prot. 358a-b) and claims for himself a certain ‘freedom over 
terminology’ (21.4.10-11). He is thus dismissive of those who are overly 
concerned with words, arguments, and definitions. 
Maximus claims to offer something different to these sophists.6 He presents 
himself as an expert in proper philosophy and declares that: 
                                                   
3  Sophist: e.g., Dillon 1977:232, 399; Bowersock 2004:60. Halbphilosoph: see the 
references in Lauwers 2013:331 n. 1. Writing about Lucian, Graham Anderson defines 
the Halbphilosoph as ‘the rhetorical writer who concerned himself with moral (and very 
often religious) commonplace’ (1982:64). 
4  For the programmatic nature of this text, see Koniaris 1982:106. 
5  English translations of Maximus are from Trapp 1997a. The Greek text is taken from the 
Teubner edition (Trapp 1994) reproduced online by Thesaurus Linguae Graecae. 
6  Philostratus’s Lives of the Sophists reminds us that the debate over where to draw the 
line separating sophists from philosophers is an ancient one. Eshleman 2012 and 
Lauwers 2015 have sought to situate this debate in the socio-cultural world in which 
these intellectuals wrote and spoke in order to demonstrate how and why these 
categories are constructed by the participants in this debate.  
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The summit of philosophy and the road that leads there demand a teacher 
who can rouse young men’s souls and guide their ambitions. His task is to 
temper their desires ... (1.8.13-15). 
And earlier in Oration 1, Maximus speaks of his philosophical project in terms of 
the pursuit of virtue (1.4.18). Maximus’s own description of his task establishes the 
individual’s moral progress as its ultimate goal. This ethical focus, combined with 
his popularising tendency, suggests that we recognise Maximus as contributing to 
the phenomenon of popular philosophy.7 
The ‘popular philosophy’ in view here is difficult to define with any 
precision.8 It is possible to construct a profile of popular philosophy by examining 
those texts that are considered part of this phenomenon. Johan Thom identifies the 
following as characteristic of popular philosophy in the Hellenistic-Roman world: 
an emphasis on ethics rather than other more technical philosophical topics; 
a tendency towards selecting doctrines and ideas from various sources 
rather than staying within one tradition; a focus on the moral progress of the 
individual rather than a social ethic; psychagogical principles and practices 
to promote and support spiritual maturity; and the tendency to popularize 
philosophical ideas (2012:295). 
In what follows, I will show how Maximus’s sermon on Diogenes’s way of life fits 
snugly within Thom’s definition of popular philosophy. That Maximus should be 
considered as a proponent of popular philosophy is not a novel thesis.9 What I hope 
to do here is to show how one particular example of a popular philosophical 
sermon is circumscribed by this definition. 
The golden and iron way of life 
Maximus begins his exhortation with, as he describes it, an Aesop-like fable 
(μῦθος) in which Zeus commands Prometheus to colonize the earth with human 
beings. Prometheus populates the earth with human beings who then lead ‘an easy 
                                                   
7  Use of the phrase ‘popular philosophy’ to speak of Hellenistic-Roman texts that focus 
on practical ethics is usually traced back to Konrat Ziegler’s entry ‘Plutarchos von 
Chaironeia’ in the Realencyclopädie (1951). For further discussion, see Van Hoof 
2010:1-7; Thom 2015:49-56. 
8  Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé 2007 describes popular philosophy in terms of a collection of 
ethical topoi presented in an appealing way that aims to bring about moral change in its 
audience. Similarly, Troels Engberg-Pedersen refers to ‘a more or less connected set of 
philosophical ideas in ethics that has no distinct profile as belonging to this or the other 
hairesis, but is rather shared by all or most of them’ (2017:23).   
9  See Goulet-Cazé 2007 and Thom 2015:53.   
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life’ (Or. 36.1.12). Although Maximus knows Plato’s Protagoras,10 he is not at this 
point drawing from the creation myth found in Plato’s dialogue (Protag. 320c-
322d). Instead, he alludes to those versions of the myth in which Prometheus 
creates humankind from clay.11 The humans created by Prometheus live in a perfect 
climate in which the Nymphs provide water in clear springs and the earth brings 
forth food without the intervention of farmers. 
Living as they did off the rich resources that came to them of their own 
accord, there was nothing they needed to fight over. ... [People lived] a life 
that knew no wars and no iron weapons,12 that was peaceful and had no need 
of garrisons, where nothing was fought over, a healthy life that lacked for 
nothing; it would seem that ‘the golden race’ is Hesiod’s teasing term for 
this era (Or. 36.1.20-27). 
While Maximus directs his audience’s attention to Hesiod (Op. 109-126) as one of 
his sources, the Myth of the Golden Age is a topos found throughout Greek and 
Latin literature (Baldry 1952).13 In keeping with this tradition, Maximus describes 
an earlier, idealised world of plenty in which people live in peace with the world 
and with each other. 
In good Platonic form, Maximus proposes to proceed from μῦθος to λόγος,14 
in order to draw a comparison between this golden way of life and what he calls 
the ‘iron’ way of life (36.2.3). The Iron Age describes the coming of civilization. 
In this period, people have  
divided the earth up into lots and have each carved out of it separate 
portions, surrounding them with enclosures and walls ... building shelters 
and adding inner and outer doors and porches (36.2.4-6, 10-12). 
People no longer inhabit the ‘grassy meadows and tree-covered hills’ of the Golden 
Age (36.1.13-14), but dwell in homes and cities. On view is the ancient contrast 
between living according to nature (Golden Age) and living according to human 
custom in the οἶκος and πόλις (Iron Age). Maximus is already preparing his 
                                                   
10  See, e.g., Or. 21.4.  
11  E.g., Ovid, Met. 1.82-88; Horace, Carm. 1.16.13-16. Carol Dougherty (2006) discusses 
the figure of Prometheus and its reception. 
12  By mentioning ‘iron weapons,’ Maximus alludes to the way of life he will describe in 
the following section. 
13  Maximus follows Hesiod and the Greek tradition of referring to a ‘golden race’ 
(χρύσεον γένος); the term ‘golden age’ (aurea saecula or aurea aetas) is found in 
Augustan and post-Augustan Latin literature (Baldry 1952:87-90).   
14  See Plato, Protag. 324d. Maximus does not reproduce a Platonic philosophical position 
at this point, but a Platonic ‘method’ of moving an argument forward. The same method 
is on view at Or. 14.3.1. 
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audience to accept that the Cynic way of life, marked as it is by an appeal to 
nature, is to be preferred. 
The Iron Age marks a departure from the ideal presented in the Golden Age 
in other ways. Whereas the golden race had sufficient resources so that ‘there was 
nothing they needed to fight over’ (36.1.20-22), the race of iron is in a state of 
disunity and strife. They are enslaved by their love of luxury: ‘cramping their 
necks, their heads, or their fingers with gold, in a form of bondage’ (36.2.8-9).  
The earth, sea, and air — along with the animals that occupy these regions — are 
harassed. Most striking, however, is the terrible combination of cognitive 
dissonance and discontent that plagues those who are part of the iron race. 
Maximus uses over half of this section (36.2.21-45) to describe the various 
sites of tension experienced by the individual: 
... pursuing pleasant experiences and entangling themselves in painful ones; 
grasping after wealth, forever convinced that what they have is inferior to 
what they do not, and that what they have acquired is less than what they 
look forward to; fearing want, but unable to satiate themselves; fearing 
death, but taking no thought for life ... 
Dio Chrysostom’s sixth oration, to which Maximus is, in all likelihood, indebted 
(Trapp 1997a:282), contains a similar passage. Dio adopts the voice of Diogenes 
the Cynic to argue that, contrary to popular belief, the Persian king is the most 
miserable man alive (6.35):  
When sober, he longed for intoxication in the belief that he would then have 
relief from his misfortunes, and when drunk, he imagined himself to be 
ruined just because he was unable to help himself. And further, when 
awake, he prayed for sleep that he might forget his fears, but when asleep he 
would immediately leap up, imagining that his very dreams were killing 
him (6.36-37; trans. Cohoon [LCL]). 
The contrast in Dio is between Diogenes and the Great King, whereas in Maximus, 
the contrast is between those who belong to the golden race and the iron race. In 
both cases, however, the contrast is between those who enjoy a self-sufficient 
contentment and those who are unable to exercise mastery over their desires.  
This focus on individual virtue can be contrasted with the way the myth is 
used by two writers known to Maximus: Aratus and Plato.15 Degeneration is also in 
view in Aratus’s version of the myth (Phaenomena 96-136). Aratus uses the myth 
to explain the gradual disappearance of justice among humankind. Initially, justice 
                                                   
15  For Maximus’s use of Aratus, see Or. 24.1. For his use of the Protagoras, see Orr. 2.2; 
18.5; 21.4; 27.8; 30.1; 31.4. 
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dwelt on earth with the golden race. With the advent of the silver race, she dwelt in 
the hills, keeping her distance. Finally, when the bronze race was born, ‘verily did 
Justice loathe that race of men and fly heavenward and took up that abode’  
(133-135; trans. Mair [LCL]). The myth in Protagoras is more about human 
development than degeneration. In the explanations and arguments that follow it 
(222d-224d), however, the myth is once again related to questions of society and 
justice. Even if Maximus notes the social conditions that pertain in each of the two 
ages he describes, he points his audience to the nature of the individual. 
In the next section (3.1-4.8), Maximus addresses his hearers to ask which of 
these two ways of life is to be preferred. He is not shy of stacking the rhetorical 
deck: 
What man is so witless and ill-starred in his passion and so wretched that, 
for love of minor and ephemeral pleasures and disputed goods and uncertain 
hopes and ambivalent prosperity, he would refuse to change his ways and 
migrate to certain happiness? And that knowing that he will free himself of 
many times as many ills, which, mixed up as they are in the second style of 
life, must inevitably surround its living with hostile circumstances, making 
it wretched and wholly miserable? (4.1-8). 
If calling them the ‘golden’ and ‘iron’ way of life did not make it sufficiently clear 
to his audience, by the end of this section, there is no doubt as to which way of life 
Maximus is recommending. 
The second way of life experiences ‘conflict and dissension,’ it is ‘not 
simple, but constrained and pitiable and loaded with painful circumstances’ 
(36.3.1, 4-5). It is marked by pleasures, but these are accompanied by pain 
(36.3.11-12). The first way of life, on the other hand, is ‘the simple life, untroubled 
by external circumstance, and secure in the possession of its freedom’ (36.3.3-4). 
Although the Golden Age is also described as a ‘peaceable, unconfined, wantless, 
pain-free existence’ (36.3.16-17), it is freedom, above all, that defines it.16  As we 
will see, the language here anticipates the description of Diogenes in Or. 36.5-6 
and the type of life to which Maximus is exhorting his audience. 
Maximus introduces the ideal type that Diogenes embodies by describing 
the inhabitant of the Golden Age as ‘that naked, homeless, craftless one,17 the 
citizen and inhabitant of the whole world’ (τὸν γυμνὸν ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἄοικον καὶ 
ἄτεχνον, τὸν πάσης τῆς γῆς πολίτην καὶ ἐφέστιον; 36.3.8-9). That this is an 
                                                   
16  In this section: ἐλευθερία ‘freedom’ (36.3.11, 14); ἀπαλλάσσω ‘to set free’ (36.4.5-6). 
17  The description of the inhabitant of the Golden Age as ἄτεχνος comes from versions of 
the myth (Aeschylus’ Prometheus Unbound; Plato’s Protagoras) in which Prometheus 
introduces fire and, by extension, technology to humankind. For this version of 
Prometheus, see Dougherty 2006:75-84.  
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allusion to Diogenes is clear from the way the Cynic is described elsewhere. 
Epictetus’s Diogenes says that he is ‘without a house (ἄοικος), and without a city 
(ἄπολις), and an exile, if it so chance, and without a hearth (ἀνέστιος)’ (Arr. Epict. 
diss. 4.11.23; trans. Oldfather [LCL]; cf. 3.22.47). Similarly, Diogenes Laertius 
says the Cynic is ‘a homeless exile, to his country dead (ἄπολις, ἄοικος, πατρίδος 
ἐστερημένος), a wanderer who begs his daily bread’ (6.38; trans. Hicks [LCL]). If 
the Diogenes portrayed by these writers is ‘without a hearth’ and ‘bereft of a 
homeland’, Maximus’s figure is the more positive, cosmopolitan one — a ‘citizen 
and inhabitant of the whole world’.18 This is in keeping with the positive portrayal 
of life in the Golden Age that is free from traditional boundaries. 
In the final part of his sermon in which the two ages are contrasted (36.4.8-
32), Maximus demonstrates his Platonic heritage with an allusion to Plato’s 
allegory of the cave (Resp. 514a-517c). Those in the Iron Age live as prisoners in 
the darkness, ‘laden with heavy fetters on their feet and heavy rings around their 
necks and their hands tied in rough bonds’ (36.4.11-14). These are the same people 
who adorn with gold their necks, heads, and fingers (36.2.8-9). Furthermore, in this 
prison one hears ‘groans and song, lamentation and jubilation together’ (36.4.19-
21). Maximus drives home the same point made earlier: that pleasure is always 
accompanied by pain (36.3.11-12).  
In contrast to this imprisoned way of life, the life of those in the Golden 
Age is like ‘a man living in the pure light of day, with no bonds on his hands or 
feet, able to move his neck in any direction he wishes, gazing towards the sun’ 
(36.4.21-24). In this section, the note of freedom that first rang out in the 
description of the Golden Age receives a Platonic modulation.  
The myth of the Golden Age and its comparison with the Iron Age, together 
with the reworking of Plato’s cave allegory, serve as a backdrop to the stage upon 
which Maximus places the Cynic sage Diogenes. 
Diogenes 
Maximus begins the climactic section of his sermon by turning to Diogenes the 
Cynic as an example of one ‘who lived his life not under the reign of Cronus,19 but 
in the midst of this present race of iron’ (36.5.2-4). Although the Cynic is initially 
unnamed, Maximus expects his audience to recognise this ‘native of Sinope in 
                                                   
18  See, e.g., Diog. Laert. 6.63; Arr. Epict. diss. 3.22.22. We also see Epictetus’s Cynic 
forgoing traditional loyalties in order to be a messenger, scout, and herald to the whole 
world (3.22.69). 
19  A reference to the Golden Age. 
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Pontus’ (36.5.8-9) who was ‘liberated by Zeus and by Apollo’ (36.5.4-5).20 The 
most characteristic feature of this figure is his freedom. 
Maximus echoes the Cynic tradition that defines Diogenes in terms of his 
freedom:21   
Counselled by Apollo, he freed himself from all oppressive circumstances 
and, releasing himself from their bonds, travelled freely about the world 
(36.5.9-11). 
The counsel Diogenes received from Apollo through the Delphic oracle was to 
‘deface the currency’, which was understood in terms of breaking with law and 
custom.22 This act is also associated with Diogenes’ departure from Sinope, and 
hence, is seen as the cause of his exile and paradoxical freedom. Through his 
actions, Diogenes ‘freed himself from all oppressive circumstances (περιστάσεις)’ 
and travelled the world like ‘a bird with the gift of reason’ (36.5.9-11). The bird 
imagery speaks of freedom, while the focus on Diogenes’ mind draws our attention 
to his status as a philosopher. These two aspects of Diogenes’ person make him an 
ideal figure for Maximus’ purposes in this particular philosophical sermon. 
According to Maximus, Diogenes is free from tyrannical rule, laws and 
constitutions, marriage and rearing children, and from having to work (36.5.12-20). 
In view here is the Cynic political — or rather, anti-political — tradition, which 
denigrates all aspects of civic and communal life that, in the rest of the classical 
tradition, played such a central role in defining the good life.23 In the final part of 
his sermon (36.6), Maximus will argue that by avoiding these things altogether, 
Diogenes was able to escape the oppressive circumstances they created (see 
below). 
                                                   
20  The figure in question is only identified as Diogenes later in this section, at Or. 36.5.46 
and Or. 36.6.1. In Or. 34.9.9 he remains anonymous and is identified only as ‘the athlete 
from Pontus’. Diogenes is not unique is this regard. Aesop, for example, is identified 
simply as ‘the sage of Lydia’ (36.1.1). The confidence that Maximus has when it comes 
to his audience’s ability to recognise these figures suggests that we are dealing with a 
group that has at least a basic knowledge of the Greek literary and philosophical 
tradition.  
21  See, e.g., Diogenes Laertius: ‘the manner of life he [Diogenes] lived was the same as 
that of Heracles when he preferred liberty (ἐλευθερίας) to everything’ (6.71). 
22  For the slogan ‘defacing the currency’ (Diog. Laert. 6.20) as a critique of society, see 
Goulet-Cazé 2019:33-36; Branham 1996. 
23  Ps.-Diogenes Ep. 47; Diog. Laert. 6.29, 38, 54, 63, 72; Luc. Vit. Auct. 9. See, further, 
Branham 2007:72, 75-76; Goulet-Cazé 2019:36-37. 
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Another topos frequently employed by writers about Diogenes was that his 
happiness was greater than that of the Great King.24 According to Maximus, 
Diogenes ‘lived the life of a free and fearless king’ (36.5.20-21).25 He then 
contrasts the traditional exemplar of luxury and softness, the Persian king, with 
Diogenes. The Cynic sage is able to enjoy a life that is, from his perspective, even 
more comfortable and pleasant than the king’s, but without the attendant concerns, 
since the sage lives in accordance with nature. He migrates in concert with the 
seasons. ‘His palaces were temples and gymnasia and groves, his treasure the 
richest and most secure and the least plotted-against of all, the whole earth and its 
fruit and springs that are born of the earth’ (36.5.24-27). The allusions to the way 
of life in the Golden Age are unmistakable. Two separate but related aspects of the 
Diogenes tradition are in view at this point. First, Maximus explains Diogenes’s 
success by the fact that he lived according to nature (36.5.32-33). Second, by living 
according to nature, the sage is completely independent and self-sufficient. 
Maximus ignores the fact that, in the Golden Age, self-sufficiency was easily 
achieved as a result of the abundance produced by the earth, while in the Iron Age 
it is achieved only through asceticism.26 
Finally, Maximus argues that Diogenes enjoyed a life of peace (36.5.37-47). 
In Dio Chrysostom, the philosopher claims to 
go by night whithersoever I will and travel by day unattended, and I am not 
afraid to go even through an army if need be, without the herald’s staff, yea, 
and amid brigands; for I have no enemy, public or private, to block my way 
(6.60; trans. Cohoon [LCL]). 
It is unclear from Dio why this should be the case for Diogenes. Is it because of his 
status as an exile / cosmopolitan? Certainly, the boundary-less cosmopolitan life 
without walls and other divisions described in the Golden Age would ensure that 
war was eliminated. Even though he raised it earlier in his sermon, Maximus does 
not return to this theme. He explains, instead, that  
Criminals and tyrants and informers alike left him [Diogenes] alone, 
because he could show up the wicked not with sophisticated arguments, 
                                                   
24  Arr. Epict. diss. 3.22.60; Luc. Vit. auct. 9. As mentioned before, Maximus seems to 
draw on Dio Chrysostom’s sixth oration, at the heart of which stands thist contrast 
between Diogenes and the Great King.  
25  This theme is raised again in Or. 36.6 where Diogenes’s life is declared to be superior to 
that of Lycurgus, Solon, Artoxerxes [sic], and Alexander. 
26  On Cynic asceticism, see Goulet-Cazé 2019:45-49. On the existence of an ‘austere’ 
versus a ‘mild’ Cynicism, see Malherbe 1982:48-59. Goulet-Cazé (2019:59-71) argues 
that the differences between Cynics should be attributed to their individual personalities, 
rather than to different ‘types’ or sects of Cynics. 
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which is the most painful way to be shown up, but by confronting deeds 
with deeds on each new occasion (36.5.41-45). 
As Dudley writes of the historical Diogenes, ‘He endeavoured to convert men to  
a truer way of life, not, like Socrates, by dialectic, nor by allegory, as did 
Antisthenes, but by the practical example of his daily life’ (Dudley 1937:28).  
The stories that circulated about Diogenes in Maximus’s day seemed to confirm 
this assessment of the Cynic philosopher. This emphasis on deeds over words also 
provided an implicit critique of those Maximus identifies as ‘sophists’, who give 
great attention to clever words but ignore virtue.27  
The Golden Age was marked by a peace achieved by the fact that everyone 
had what he or she needed: ‘where nothing was fought over, a healthy life that 
lacked for nothing’ (36.1.24-25). This is not a peace that is attainable through 
individual virtue. By confronting his opponents with his virtue expressed in deeds, 
Diogenes ensured that he was left alone. This is the peace of the recluse.   
After illustrating Diogenes’s freedom with examples from the Diogenes 
tradition that he was able to connect implicitly to the Golden Age, Maximus 
concludes his sermon by appealing to his audience to follow Diogenes’s example. 
‘How then could this life of Diogenes’s, which he chose of his own free will, 
which Apollo granted him, which Zeus approved, which all men of sense admire, 
fail to be preferable?’ (36.6.1-3). 
The last section contains the closest Maximus gets to philosophical 
definitions in this sermon. The ‘hostile circumstances’ (περιστάσεις) that 
Diogenes’s freedom allows him to escape are defined as ‘the performance of 
activities that the agent has not freely chosen’ (36.6.4-5). Maximus is not explicit 
about why these are necessarily evil. His logic seems to be that ‘hostile 
circumstances’ are evil because these are actions that are forced upon us when we 
choose the wrong ends instead of being freely chosen actions.28 
Every man who chooses these objectives [family, work, etc.] has to live 
through a life beset by circumstance, and to endure labours that are neither 
voluntary, nor yet accepted in ignorance of those goods that truly deserve 
choice in their own right (36.6.12-14). 
At the heart of the Cynic life is freedom; this has been thrust of Maximus’s sermon 
up until this point. True freedom must include the ability to choose to live in such a 
way as to avoid those things judged to be undesirable and to choose those things 
                                                   
27  For disparagement of sophists, see Or. 1.8. Or. 15.6: If Heracles chose a life of leisure, 
he would have been considered a ‘sophist.’ In Or. 20.3, sophists mimic philosophers, 
but they differ from philosophers in virtue.  
28  I am here following Trapp (1997a:288 n. 35). 
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that are truly good. Diogenes’s radical solution is to avoid completely things like 
marriage and children and political participation, thus ensuring that any 
undesirable circumstances are also avoided.  
Maximus lists six categories of people who might be considered free, but 
who are in reality not: the demagogue, orator, tyrant, general, sailor, and 
philosopher. Demagogues are enslaved to the crowds, orators to stern jurors, 
tyrants to their own hedonism, generals to the vagaries of fortune, and sailors to ‘an 
unstable science’. Each of these figures is enslaved since they lack the freedom to 
determine their own fate; they are required to make choices about something they 
perceive as a good, following which something or someone external to them can 
potentially bring about a situation that is unfavourable to them. Demagogues might 
choose a certain path in order to achieve power, only to realise that subsequent 
actions are forced upon them by the crowds. They are thus not truly free.  
It is at first surprising that Maximus includes the philosopher in this list. 
Has he not already demonstrated that the philosophical life is preferable? It is 
specifically the Cynic life that is preferable in this sermon, not any version of the 
philosophic life. After all, as he proves from history, the two brightest stars in the 
philosophical galaxy (at least as far as Maximus is concerned) — Socrates and 
Plato — were both subject to hostile circumstances beyond their control. On this 
count, then, they prove themselves less worthy of emulation than Diogenes who, 
by choosing the golden way of life even while living in the world of iron, was able 
to free himself from hostile circumstances. 
At first glance, this seems like a radical prescription, even for a Cynic. 
Would it be possible to avoid choosing any course of action that might possibly 
lead to ‘hostile circumstances’? This seems unlikely. In other Cynic texts, the sage 
is able to adapt to his or her circumstances in order to endure them in such a way 
that their equanimity is not disturbed.  Philosophy taught Diogenes to be prepared 
for any fate (Diog. Laert. 6.63) and the way philosophy achieved this was to 
cultivate self-sufficiency and independence in the Cynic sage. More often than not, 
asceticism achieved this self-sufficiency for the sage. According to Theophrastus, 
by watching a mouse scurrying about, ‘not looking for a place to lie down in, not 
afraid of the dark, not seeking any of the things which are considered to be 
dainties, he [Diogenes] discovered the means of adapting himself to circumstances’ 
(Diog. Laert. 6.22; trans. Hicks [LCL]). The Cynic is thus able to transcend a 
potentially hostile circumstance like scarcity through ascetic practices which train 
the sage to endure scarcity with equanimity.    
But it is also possible to avoid hostile circumstances altogether. Teles says 
that one must live like a sailor: ‘looking to the winds and circumstances: if 
favorable, use them; if not favourable, stop’ (Teles On circumstances 6.25-27; 
trans. O’Neil). Although this might suggest adaptability, it could also point to a 
102  MORE 
 
different approach in which negative experiences are avoided rather than endured. 
There is a tension at this point that can be glimpsed elsewhere.  
With regard to the weather, for example, Maximus writes that Diogenes 
would move from Attica to the Isthmus according to the seasons, not between 
Bablyon and Persia like the Great King (36.5.20-24). In Dio Chrysostom Or. 6.1-7 
this movement is explained in terms of Diogenes’s modest climatological needs 
that are contrasted with the grandiose movements of the king. However, in 
Maximus, a few lines later, we are told that Diogenes ‘made no attempt to run 
away from the seasons Zeus sends, or to work against him by creating artificial 
heat in the winter and desiring cooling measures in the summer’ (36.5.29-32).  
In the second case, Diogenes’s asceticism allows him to endure the extremes of 
summer and winter. In the first case, Diogenes adapts to the weather by moving 
and avoiding the extremes.29 
We might identify two Cynic approaches to hostile circumstance: endure or 
avoid. Maximus uses the example of Diogenes to encourage his audience to adopt 
the second approach. More subtly, though, in the name of freedom, he exhorts 
them to consider the steps they might need to follow in order to reach a particular 
good. If a particular good forces ‘hostile circumstances’ upon them, then they 
would best avoid that good. 
Conclusion 
Maximus of Tyre’s sermon on choosing the Cynic way of life as exemplified in 
Diogenes (Oration 36) matches closely the characteristics of popular philosophy 
described by Thom (2012):  
First, there is a definite focus on ethics at the expense of more technical 
topics and more technical analyses. With the exception of ‘hostile circumstances’, 
περιστάσεις, Cynic technical vocabulary is absent from this sermon. 
Second, ideas are sourced from across the boundaries that divided the 
ancient philosophical schools. We have seen Maximus draw on a range of literary 
and philosophical topoi. In particular, we should note Maximus’s innovative 
incorporation of the example of Diogenes and the Golden Age myth.30  
Third, the goal of this speech is to encourage moral progress on the part of 
the individual student, rather than to assert a social ethic or to encourage the 
                                                   
29  Even in this case, though, the fact that he does not have to move as far as the Great King 
suggests something of his modest needs. On Cynic ‘liberty from the seasons’, see Martin 
1997:103-104. 
30  Trapp notes that the link between the Golden Age and Diogenes is unusual (1997a:282). 
On the more general relationship between myth and the Cynic life, see Martin 1997. 
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student to develop such a social ethic. The freedom to which this sermon points is  
a personal freedom that the individual must use for the purpose of their happiness. 
Fourth, while principles and practices of spiritual or moral guidance are not 
directly in view in this speech, other sermons in the collection suggest that this was 
indeed a concern for Maximus.31 
Finally, Maximus is clearly engaged in a process of popularizing the 
philosophical ideas inherited from his sources. We might note, at this point, that his 
efforts at popularizing these ideas coincide with his desire to show his facility with 
the Greek philosophical and literary tradition that was so important in his day.32 
Maximus thus engages in a mode of popular philosophical rhetoric in order 
to encourage his audience to pursue a type of Cynic independence that it best 
thought of in terms of freedom. As is the case with modern intellectuals who 
engage the broader public through online media, newspaper columns, and self-help 
books, Maximus’s philosophical prowess cannot be judged solely on the basis of 
these sermons. We cannot say with certainty whether the intellectual limitations of 
his sermons are indicative of poor philosophy or accommodating communication. 
If we assume that Maximus is deliberately contributing to popular philosophy and 
filling a niche between the showy rhetoric of the Sophists and the philosophers’ 
discussion of language and logic then we can attribute a certain skill to Maximus, 
even if his writings fall short of philosophical prowess. 
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